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Market power and double-dipping in nutrient trading markets  
 
 
Abstract. Heavy loads of nutrients, i.e. nitrogen and phosphorus, cause severe damages in many 
waters in the world. This paper develops a model for nutrient trading markets for a sea damaged 
by both nitrogen and phosphorus and faces a dominant polluter of one or both nutrients. The 
existence of abatement measures with simultaneous impacts on both nutrients raises the need for 
double-dipping in both markets. It is shown that double-dipping decreases overall abatement 
costs for reaching predetermined targets, and reduces efficiency losses of market power, in 
particular when the same agent exercises market power in both markets. An empirical 
application to the intergovernmental agreement on reducing nutrient loads to the eutrophied 
Baltic Sea in North-East Europe demonstrates cost savings of approximately 25% from 
introduction of double-dipping, and that efficiency losses from market power of one dominant 
country, Poland, can be reduced by 10%.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Since early 1950s global nitrogen loads to coastal water have been doubled and phosphorus loads 
have been tripled (Selman et al., 2008). These increases have created the documented raise in 
number of eutrophied coastal zones from 10 hypoxic areas in early 1960’s to at least 169 in 2007 
(Selman et al., 2008).  Damages from eutrophication are oxygen depletion, occurrences of 
harmful algal blooms, and changes in composition of fish species at the disadvantage of 
commercial species. For example, excess blooms of a toxin-producing flagellate killed large 
numbers of fish in the Baltic Sea and Atlantic coast of the USA (Rosenberg et al., 1988; 
Burkholder and Glasgow, 1997), and one event of algal blooms destroyed 90% of the fish 
population in farms in Hongkong (Selman et al., 2008). Estimates of partial damage cost of 
eutrophication show that incomes losses can be substantial in anchovy fishery in the Black Sea 
(Knowler et al., 2001; Knowler and Barbier, 2005), and in North Carolina's brown shrimp 
fishery (Huang et al., 2012). Other studies indicate that people are willing to pay significant 
amounts, up to 10% of their annual income, to restore a eutrophied sea (e.g. Huang, 1997; 
Söderquist, 1998; Remoundou et al., 2009).  
 
These manifestations of eutrophication have been recognized in practice which has been revealed 
by the implementation of a variety of policy instruments affecting nutrient loads to water courses 
(OECD, 2007). Nutrient trading market was identified as a promising instrument already in the 
1960s, and has been implemented for controlling nitrogen or phosphorus in a large number of 
drainage basins, mainly in the US but also in Australia and China (Kraemer et al., 2004; SEPA, 
2008). However, eutrophication management requires control of both nitrogen and phosphorus 
since damages are caused by unbalanced loads in these nutrients (e.g. Diaz and Rosenberg, 
2008). This feature calls for instruments that allow for double-dipping in both markets when 
abatement measures exist that simultaneously affect both nutrients. That is, if an abatement 
measure reduces both nitrogen and phosphorus it should be considered in both nutrient markets.  
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Examples of double-acting measures are construction of wetlands as nutrient traps and reduction 
of livestock holdings which reduce both nitrogen and phosphorus. Another feature of 
eutrophication management is the potential existence of a dominating emission source, such as a 
large country in the catchment of an international sea like the North Sea or Baltic Sea. This may 
give rise to inefficiencies caused by the exercise of market power. The purpose of this study is to 
analyse the role of double-dipping for the functioning of nutrient trading markets, nitrogen and 
phosphorus, with market power in one or both markets. The model is applied to the Baltic Sea, 
which has been subject to long term monitoring and modelling generating necessary data for the 
empirical application (e.g. Savchuck and Wulff, 2009; Gren et al.,  2008).  
 
Starting in mid 1960s there is today a large body of literature on emission trading for improving 
water quality (e.g. Dales, 1968;  Shortle, 1990; Shortle and Horan, 2001; Horan et al., 2002; 
Byström et al., 2000; Lukanski et al., 2008; Shortle and Horan 2008; Elofsson, 2010; Prabodanie 
et al. 2010). This can be traced to Coase (1960) who was among the first to suggest a market 
mechanism for negative externalities. A specific challenge of the design of water quality trading 
is the heterogeneity and uncertainty with respect to impacts on water recipients from different 
point and non-point emission sources. Several studies have also demonstrated the difficulties of 
achieving benefits from trade with heterogeneous polluters and several coupled water receptors 
(e.g. Prabodanie et al. 2010). With many receptors, agents have to trade at several markets, and 
trading ratios are required due to the different impacts on the receptors among point and non-
point source polluters.  
 
However, this paper will disregard the challenges imposed by optimal design of a permit market 
for trading between point and non-sources within a drainage basin. Instead, the focus is on the 
design of nutrient markets for trading among drainage basins with discharges into a common 
water body such as a marine sea. he inclusion of market power and consideration of two 
nutrients makes this paper mostly related to two strains of the literature; market structure and 
permit trading, and double-dipping in markets for measures affecting several pollutants. The  
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large body of literature on market power and emission trading was initiated by the seminal paper 
by Hahn (1984), who investigated the implication on cost effectiveness from exercise of market 
power. Since then developments have been made with respect to consideration of banking of 
permits during time (Liski and Montero, 2005), of market power also in the product market 
(Hintermann, 2011), of non-compliance (van Egteren and Weber, 1996), and of conditions for 
the development and exercise of market power (Lange, 2012).  The implication of economics of 
scope in abatement for policy design has been analysed in several papers, where Beavis and 
Walker (1979) provides an early contribution on the efficient design of multiple pollution 
charges. Michaelis (1992) considers efficient charges with multiple stock pollutants. Montero 
(2001) investigates efficient design of multiple trading markets under incomplete enforcement, 
and Woodward (2011) establishes conditions for efficiency gains from double-dipping.   
 
The main contribution of this paper is the simultaneous consideration of market power and 
double-dipping in multiple emission trading markets. A theoretical model is constructed with 
two main features; market power is modelled as a monopolist with a competitive fringe in each 
market (e.g. Xepapadeas, 1997) and economics of scope is represented as joint abatement costs 
(e.g. Baumol et al., 1988). The model is applied to nutrient trading for meeting international 
agreements on nutrient load targets for the eutrophied Baltic Sea (Helcom, 2007). Although there 
is a relatively large body of literature on cost effective nutrient reductions to an international sea 
(Ollikanien and Hokatukla, 2001; Elofsson 2010; Gren and Destouni, 2012) there is no study 
addressing nutrient trading markets, multifunctional abatement measures, and market power.  
Nutrient permit markets for the Baltic Sea have been evaluated by Elofsson (2010) but not under 
influence of market power and/or allowance for double-dipping.   
 
The paper is organised as follows. First, the model for nutrient trading is presented. Next, data 
retrieval is described and empirical results are presented. The paper ends with a brief summary 
and some tentative conclusions.  
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2. A model of nutrient permits trading 
 
 
Two markets are considered, one for each nutrient. The size of the markets, 
E
M for E=N,P 
where N is nitrogen and P is phosphorus, are assumed to be determined by restrictions on 
nutrient loads for achieving ecological conditions, such as the intergovernmental agreement on 
the Baltic Sea Action Plan (Helcom, 2007). Following Xepapadeas (1997) market structure is 
modelled as a monopoly with one dominating emission source and a competitive fringe. The 
f=1,..,n actors on the markets are thus divided among the monopolist, actor 1,  and the fringe 
consisting of the remaining actors, f=2,..,n. Nutrient loads in each country are determined by 
business as usual load (BAU), LEf’ ,   minus abatement, REf, which is written as LEf=LEf’ – REf. 
Total loads of nutrient are limited by the market size, i.e. .
2
1 EEfn
f
E MLL ≤+∑ =  
 
For each country, the cost of abatement is described by the function ),( PfNfff RRCC = . 
Multifunctional abatement technologies give rise to economies of scope, which are defined as 
<*)*,( PfNff RRC  *)( Eff
E
RC∑ . That is, the cost of joint abatement of certain amounts of 
nitrogen and phosphorus is lower than the sum of costs of separate abatement by the same 
amount of each nutrient (e.g Panzar and Willig, 1981; Baumol et al., 1988).  Differentiation of 
the cost function with respect to each nutrient gives the marginal abatement cost of nitrogen as  
),( fPfNfR
f
R RRCC fNfN =  and that of phosphorus as ),(
fPfNf
R
f
R RRCC fPfP = , with the second 
derivatives  0,0,0 <>> f RR
f
RR
f
RR fPfNfNfNfPfP CCC , and 0<
f
RR fNfPC .   
 
Given a certain initial allocation of permits, 
Ef
M ,  and prices of nutrient permits, pE,  a country 
in the competitive fringe minimises total cost of abatement and permit purchases according to  
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and associated first-order conditions are 
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For an interior solution, eq. (2) states that marginal abatement cost equals the permit price. It is 
shown in Appendix A that abatement of both nutrients is increasing in each of the nutrient prices, 
which results from the properties of the cost function.  Under a single market system, i.e. when 
double-dipping is not allowed, abatement is increasing only in the own price. 
 
The monopolist minimises total cost for abatement and permit trading similarly to the country in 
the competitive fringe as described by eq. (1). The difference is the monopolist’s impact on 
equilibrating permit prices, which is determined by the competitive fringe’s demand for nutrient 
permits. The fringe’s demand for permits is derived from each country’s optimal allocation of 
abatement measures for different levels of abatement, REf*, as described by eq. (2). This 
condition determines the optimal abatement and, hence, demand for permits as a function of the 
nutrient permit prices, which gives the optimal nutrient load as ),(' ** PNEfEfEf ppRLL −= . The 
competitive fringe’s demand for permit of one nutrient, say nitrogen, is then the sum of all 
countries’ demand at different levels of the permit price, which is defined as ),( PNNN ppLL = . 
As shown in Appendix A, abatement of each nutrient is increasing in both nutrient prices. That 
is, an increase(decrease) in price of one nutrient reduces(increases) demand for permits in both 
markets since the increased(decreased) abatement associated with the price increase(decrease) 
results in simultaneous changes in abatement of both nutrients. The corresponding inverted 
demand functions are the fringe’s marginal abatement cost functions for nutrients which show  
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the demand for permits at different prices of nutrients, which are described as  
),( EEEE LLpp −=  where –E is the other nutrient.  
 
Given the competitive fringe’s inverted demand functions for nutrient permits, the decision 
problem of the monopolist is specified as the minimisation of total costs subject to market 
clearing conditions. The market clearing condition requires that the monopolist’s supply of 
nutrient equals the competitive fringe’s demand, i.e. that EfEf
f
EE MLLM −=− ∑ =21
1 for 
each nutrient. The monopolist decision problem is then written as    
 
11
11'1111111
,
)3())(,()')(,(),(
PN
PPPPNPNNNPNNPN
RR
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                         s.t                 
                                                          
                                PNEforLARLM EiE
i
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Noting that 11 ' EE
EE RLML +−= , the first-order conditions for the monopolist when double-
dipping is allowed are delivered as   
 
)4(0)'()'(
1111111
111 =−−+−−+−
PPPP
R
NNNN
R
N
R MRLpMRLppC NNN  
)5(0)'()'(
1111111
111 =−−+−−+−
NNNN
R
PPPP
R
P
R MRLpMRLppC PPP  
 
According to eqs. (4)-(5) the monopolist abates where the marginal abatement cost of a nutrient 
equals marginal benefit. The first terms at the left hand side of (4)-(5) constitute the marginal 
abatement costs. The remaining terms express the marginal benefits which include the permit 
price, the monopolist’s adjustment of the own price, and the effect on the demand for the other 
nutrient.  In order to capture the monopoly profit, a monopolist increases the permit price by  
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reducing abatement and making use of more permits which decreases the supply of permits. This 
is shown by the third term at the left hand sides, which is positive since 01 <ER Ep  and 
0'
111 <−−
EEE MRL . The competitive fringe responds by reducing its demand for that nutrient.  
Due to complementarity in abatement there is a simultaneous decrease in demand for the other 
nutrient with an associated decrease in permit price. This is shown by the fourth terms at the 
LHS which are negative since 01 >−ER Ep and  0'
111 <−−
−−− EEE MRL . The cross price effects thus 
mitigate the increase in the own price from withholding permits. The magnitude of the impact 
depends on the cross price effect, and on the initial allocation of permits to the monopolist.  
 
When the country acts as a monopolist on only one market and there is competitive conditions on 
the other, one of the first order conditions in (4)-(5) is replaced by the corresponding condition in 
eq. (2). The counteracting impact of monopoly power in, say nitrogen market,  still occurs as a 
decrease in the competitive fringe’s demand for phosphorus when the monopoly reduces supply 
of the nitrogen in order to raise the price.  However, the mitigation effect is decreased since the 
price of phosphorus is given by the competitive market, and there is thus no consideration of the 
impact of this price on that of nitrogen. When double-dipping is not allowed, and market power 
prevails in both markets, the condition for optimality is 0)'(
1111
11 =−−+−
EEEE
R
N
R MRLppC NE  
for E=N,P. The distortion of market power is thus largest under separate markets since there are 
no counteracting effects from the monopolist’s consideration of its effects of actions on one 
nutrient market on the other nutrient market.  
 
 
As demonstrated in several papers, the market power distortion can also be effected by the 
distribution of initial permits (e.g. Xepapadeas, 1997). The smaller allocation of initial permits to 
the monopolist, the lower is the monopoly equilibrium permit price. It is shown in Appendix A 
that RE1 is decreasing, and, hence, pE increasing, in 
1E
M also when double dipping is allowed, 
and that this effect is reduced by the cross price effects. An increase in the  initial allocation of 
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permits to the monopolist of nutrient E raises the equilibrium price of this nutrient. This, in turn, 
increases the fringe’s abatement of both nutrients, which reduces the demand for the other 
nutrient and the associated equilibrium permit price. When there is monopoly power in only one 
market, say nitrogen, an increase in initial permits of nitrogen raises the equilibrium price, while 
an increase in the allocation of phosphorus permits has the opposite effects (see Appendix A). A 
larger number of permits of phosphorus increase the losses from reduced demand for this 
nutrient due to monopoly price of nitrogen (shown by the fourth term at the left hand side of (4)) 
and, hence, creates incentives to reduce the price of nitrogen. Thus, efficiency losses from 
market power can be mitigated, not only by reducing initial allocation of permits on that market, 
but also by increasing distribution of initial permits on the competitive market when double-
dipping is allowed. 
 
 
3. Application to the Baltic Sea 
 
The Baltic Sea has been reported to contain the largest anthropogenic dead zone in the world 
(Diaz and Rosenberg, 2008) and the effects of eutrophication in this system have been well 
described (Elmgren and Larsson, 2001; Conley et al., 2009).  The catchment of the sea inhabits a 
population of 85 million in the nine riparian countries (see Figure C1 in Appendix C for a map). 
Mitigation of the damage from eutrophication has been on the agenda for the riparian countries 
for decades, leading to the collaborative establishment of the Convention on the Protection of the 
Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea (Helsinki Commission HELCOM) in the late 1980s, 
working to monitor the status of the sea and to implement reduction targets for anthropogenic 
nutrient emissions and discharges (Backer and Leppänen, 2008). The long term concern of the 
Baltic Sea has also resulted in a relatively good access of data on nutrient abatement costs for the 
nine riparian countries.  
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3.1 Data retrieval  
 
Data on annual nutrient loads and abatement costs are obtained from Gren et al. (2008).  
Estimated nutrient loads from the nine riparian countries are presented in Table 1, where it is 
shown that Poland accounts for 57% of total phosphorus load and for 39% of total nitrogen load.  
 
Table 1: Nutrient load to theBaltic Sea from the riparian countries, thousand tons in 2005 
 Nitrogen 
Kton              Share of total 
Phosphorus 
Kton               Share  of total 
Denmark 44 0.05 1.1 0.03 
Finland 49 0.06 1.7 0.04 
Germany 46 0.06 0.5 0.01 
Poland 318 0.39 22.0 0.57 
Sweden 74 0.09 1.6 0.04 
Estonia 56 0.07 1.6 0.04 
Latvia 44 0.05 3.0 0.08 
Lithuania 93 0.12 3.5 0.09 
Russia 83 0.10 4.0 0.10 
     
Total 806 1.00 38.9 1.00 
Source: Gren et al. 2008, table 1 page 13 
 
Since Poland is dominating with respect to loads of, in particular, phosphorus this country is 
treated as a monopolist and the rest of the countries as a competitive fringe. The static cost 
minimisation model in Gren et al (2008) is used for obtaining cost minimising solutions with and 
without market power, and for deriving the competitive fringe’s inverted demand functions for 
both nutrients.  
 
The mathematical programming model in Gren et al. (2008) includes 13 different measures for 
nitrogen reductions and 11 abatement measures for phosphorous reductions in each drainage 
basin (see map in Figure C1 Appendix C). The included abatement measures affecting only one 
nutrient are: increased nutrient cleaning capacity at sewage treatment plants, catalysts in cars and  
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ships, flue gas cleaning in stationary combustion sources, and reductions in the agricultural 
deposition of fertilisers. Measures affecting both nutrient loads are livestock reduction, change in 
spreading time of manure from autumn to spring, cultivation of so called catch crops, energy 
forests, ley grass, and creation of wetlands.  A change of spreading time from autumn to spring 
implies less leaching since, in spring, there is a growing crop which utilises the nutrients.  Catch 
crops refer to certain grass crops, which are drilled at the same time as the ordinary spring crop 
but the growth, and thereby the use of remaining nutrients in the soil, is concentrated to the 
period subsequent to the ordinary crop harvest. Nutrient abatement cost estimates for sewage 
treatment plants, fertiliser reductions, reduction in nitrogen oxides from reduced use of fossil fuel 
and are based on econometric estimates with cross section data. Costs of measures changing land 
use include opportunity cost of land and management costs. Abatement costs of all other 
measures are obtained from enterprise budgets. 
 
Each abatement measure is also subject to capacity constraint, such as a maximum possible 
phosphorus removal at sewage treatment plants by 90 per cent. Additional constraints consist of 
the number of households that can be connected to sewage treatment plants. Limitations on 
fertiliser and livestock reductions and land use changes are imposed in order to avoid drastic 
structural changes in the agricultural sector. For a more detailed presentation of abatement 
capacities and costs of all measures, see Gren et al. (2008).  
 
A pseudo data approach is applied for estimating the inverted demand functions for nutrients, 
where data are generated from the Gren et al., (2008) static programming model (see e.g. Griffin, 
1978 for discussion of the pseudo data approach). This is made in two steps. First, a cost function 
for nutrient abatement is estimated for the competitive fringe. Second, the cost function is 
differentiated with respect to each nutrient which gives the corresponding marginal cost 
functions, and, hence, demand functions for permits. Monte Carlo simulations are carried out for 
obtaining data on costs for 500 random combinations of N and P reductions. Minimum costs are 
estimated for each combination, which results in 500 observations, see Appendix  B for  
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descriptive statistics and results from regression estimates of a quadratic cost functions using 
ordinary least square estimates.  
 
In the second step, price functions are obtained by differentiating the estimated cost functions 
with respect to competitive fringe’s nitrogen and phosphorus loads. Observing that the fringe’s 
load is determined by the sizes of the markets and the Polish loads as shown in eq. (3), the 
inverted demand functions can be written as  
 
)7()(85.3)(6026169
)6()(85.3)'(41.1632
1'111'11
1'11111
NNNPPPP
PPPNNNN
RLMRLMp
RLMRLMp
+−++−−=
+−++−−=
 
 
The own price effects are shown by the coefficients of the second term at the right hand side of 
equations (6)-(7), and the cross price effects by coefficient of the third. 
 
Finally, there is a need for defining the size of the market for each nutrient. This is determined by 
the targets set by the intergovernmental agreement, the Baltic Sea Action Plan (BSAP) (Helcom, 
2007). BSAP sets for the seven different marine basins in the Baltic Sea depending on their 
ecological status. In principle, this would require markets for each of the seven marine basins. 
However, as shown in Gren et al. (2012) the achievement of the target in the largest basin, Baltic 
Proper, generates required target achievements also in the other marine basins. The reasons are 
the relative stringent nutrient reduction targets for this basin, and the high interconnectedness 
with other marine basins. A simplification is therefore made in this numerical demonstration by 
considering only one market for each nutrient the size of which is determined by the 
requirements of the Baltic Proper, which implies nutrient loads corresponding to 35%t of BAU 
phosphorus load and 70% of BAU nitrogen load.  
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Calculations are made for single and multi markets, operating under competitive conditions and 
monopoly power. Double-dipping is allowed in the multi markets settings. The GAMS code with 
the Conopt2 solver is used for solving the problem (Brooke et al. 1998). Total abatement cost 
under two markets structures – competitive and monopoly  – and two market designs, single and 
multi nutrient markets, are shown in Figure 1. Further, results are  presented for two alternative 
allocations of initial permits under the monopoly case; one where permits are allocated with 
equal proportions, which correspond to the share of the market in relation to BAU loads, for each 
country, and one where Poland  receives all permits. This means that this country receives more 
permits to emit nitrogen than its actual loads. Although this seems unrealistic it can be of interest 
to note the distribution of carbon dioxide emission permits in excess of actual emissions to 
Russia under the Kyoto protocol. The country was essential for a legally binding international 
agreement on carbon dioxide reductions. Similarly, without Polish commitments, it will not be 
possible to achieve the nutrient targets in BSAP. An allocation where Poland receives all permits 
also gives information on the maximum effects of market power.  
 
 
Figure 1: Total abatement costs for single and multi nutrient trading markets under  
                competitive and monopoly market structures.  (1 Euro = 8.61 SEK, Nov. 25 2012) 
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The results in Figure 1 reveal that total abetment cost under competitive market is approximately 
25% lower under multi than single markets. The  total costs under competitive market structure 
come close to the only two other studies calculating costs of the BSAP agreement; Gren and 
Destouni (2012) and Elofsson (2010). Gren and Destouni (2012) obtain estimates for multi 
markets that vary between 18 and 25 billions of SEK (1 Euro = 8.61 SEK Nov. 25, 2012) 
depending on assumptions of measured BAU nutrient loads in the drainage basins. Elofsson’s 
(2010) estimates of costs for single markets amount to approximately 30 billions of SEK, which 
is slightly higher than our estimate of 28 billions of SEK.   
 
Under competitive conditions and single nutrient trading markets, approximately 2/3 of total 
costs are attributed to reaching the reduction target of phosphorus, see Table 2. The reason is the 
relatively high stringency of the phosphorus target. 
 
Table 2: Abatement costs and equilibrating permit price under single and multi markets  
              without market power 
 Abatement cost, Mill SEK1:   
N                P                Total 
Equilibrating prices, 
SEK1/kg: 
N                P 
Separate 
markets: 
   
 
 
67 
 
2308 
Poland 3225 11495 14720   
Fringe 4193 9891 14084   
Total 7418 21386 28804   
Double 
dipping    51 2106 
Poland   14284   
Fringe   8991   
Total   23275   
1) 1 Euro = 8.61 SEK, Nov. 25 2012 
 
Under multi markets the total cost is slightly larger than that for achieving the phosphorus target 
under single markets. The impact on costs of a move from single to multi markets is also shown 
by the change in equilibrating market prices; the price of nitrogen decreases by 25% and that of  
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phosphorus by 9%. The relatively large decrease in the nitrogen price is due to the impact on 
nitrogen loads from multifunctional measures implemented in the cost effective solution for 
reaching the higher phosphorus target. Common to both single and multi markets is the relatively 
equal sharing of total costs between the fringe and Poland. 
 
Efficiency losses from market power correspond, at the most, to 35% of the cost under 
competitive conditions, which occur for single markets and when Poland receives all permits. 
Corresponding efficiency losses with multi markets are 32%. It can be noticed that the efficiency 
losses are modest when initial permits are distributed with the same proportion of initial loads to 
each country. They correspond to approximately 3.3% and 3% under single and multi markets 
respectively. When comparing these results with the few existing empirical studies, which rely 
on laboratory experiments, it can be noticed that they are in line with Bohm and Carlen (1999) 
but in contrast to those obtained by Godby (2002). This can be explained by different 
assumptions with respect to means and sizes of initial distribution of permits. As shown by 
Lange (2012), relative disturbance of market power is positively related to the size of initial 
permits and to the number of actors in the market.  
 
Since the efficiency losses of monopoly power are quite modest when initial permits are 
distributed in proportion to initial use, effects of monopoly power on abatement costs and prices 
are presented only for the case when all permits of nitrogen and phosphorus are distributed to 
Poland, see Table 3. 
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Table 3: Abatement costs and permit prices in single and multi markets  
              with monopoly power by Poland.  
 
            1) 1 Euro = 8.61 SEK, Nov. 25, 2012 
 
As expected, abatement costs are lower for Poland under monopoly power compared with 
competitive conditions. Under single markets, the largest gain from monopoly power is obtained 
from the nitrogen market, which is explained by the large allocation of permits to Poland and the 
low abatement cost. The equilibrium price of nitrogen permits is almost doubled, from SEK 
67/kg N in the competitive market to SEK 124/kg under monopoly. The increase in price of 
phosphorus permits is smaller, approximately 20% from that in the competitive market. Total 
abatement cost decreases by about 1/3 when double-dipping is allowed, abatement costs increase 
for Poland and the equilibrium prices of both nutrients decrease.  
 
When Poland exercises monopoly power in only one nutrient trading market, the increase in 
corresponding equilibrium price is higher than with market power in both markets, which is 
expected from the theoretical analyses in Section 2. Under monopoly power in the nitrogen 
market, the price of SEK 106/kg N is slightly higher than when monopoly power is exercised in 
both markets, see Table C1 in appendix C. Similarly, the equilibrating price of phosphorus under 
market power for this nutrient is SEK 2516/kg P, which is slightly above the price of 2470/kg P 
with market power in both markets.   
 
 Abatement cost, Mill SEK1:   
N               P                Total 
Equilibrating prices, 
SEK1/kg: 
N                P 
Single 
markets:    124 2758 
Poland 45 6383 6428   
Fringe 14510 15712 30222   
Total 14555 23676 38231   
Multi 
markets;    104 2376 
Poland   7984   
Fringe   21533   
Total   29517   
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4. Conclusions  and discussion 
 
 
The purpose of this paper has been to analyse the impact of monopoly power and double-dipping 
in two nutrient trading markets for a eutrophied sea. The need of reducing both nutrient loads to 
a eutrophied seas and the existence of abatement measures affecting both nitrogen and 
phosphorus load raise the question whether double-dipping in both nutrient markets should be 
allowed. By constructing a model with a monopolist and competitive fringe on one or both 
markets for nutrient permits it was shown that double-dipping reduces the efficiency losses of 
market power. The reason is that the monopolist needs to consider the price effects on both 
markets when determining optimal supply of permits on one market. A decrease in supply of 
permits in one market in order to raise the equilibrium price forces the competitive fringe to 
increase abatement of that nutrient which gives a simultaneous reduction in the other nutrient. 
This reduces the demand for and hence the equilibrium permit price of that nutrient. Thus, by 
allowing for double-dipping distortions of market power could be mitigated. It was also shown 
that when market power prevails in one market but not in the other, the monopoly equilibrium 
price increases compared to when there is market power in both markets. Another theoretical 
result revealed that increases in the allocation of initial permits to the monopolist aggravate the 
distortion, but that double-dipping mitigate this effect compared with single markets. However, 
when there is market power in only one market, an increase in allocation of permits to the 
monopolist of the nutrient traded on the competitive market curbs efficiency losses of monopoly 
power.  
 
The empirical application to the Baltic Sea showed that total abatement costs for achieving the 
intergovernmental agreement set by Helcom (2007) can be reduced by approximately 25% if 
double-dipping is allowed and both nutrient markets are competitive. In this application one 
country, Poland, with major loads of both nutrients was treated as a monopolist and the 
remaining eight countries as a competitive fringe. Efficiency losses from market power turned 
out to be quite modest when the initial permits are distributed in proportion to business as usual  
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loads to each country. The market share of Poland is then too small to give large monopoly 
gains. These gains are increased when Poland receives all permits, and can increase total 
abatement costs for meeting nutrient reduction targets by approximately 35% compared to a 
competitive market. A move from single to multi-market can then decrease total abatement costs 
by 25%. 
 
Markets for nutrient trading in the Baltic Sea have been suggested by NEFCO (2008), and the 
introduction of these might benefit from experiences gained from the EU emission trading 
system (ETS) for carbon dioxides. On the other hand, the EU ETS market does not include land 
use measures, which are crucial for nutrient abatement. Instead, multifunctional land uses 
promoting several positive externalities have been supported by subsidy systems within the EU 
common agricultural policy and by national initiatives (see Nilsson et al. 2008 for a review). The 
introduction of nutrient trading markets for the Baltic Sea would thus require a change compared 
to current EU ETS system and to common subsidy practices in several EU countries.   
 
The relative advantages of trading markets compared to subsidy systems with respect to cost 
effectiveness are well established in the literature (e.g. Baumol and Oates, 1988). However, the 
establishment of several markets and allowing for double-dipping may be prevented by the 
requirement of additionality. In principle, additionality is defined by an activity which produces 
‘extra good’ relative to a baseline scenario. This principle is of vital importance for projects 
under the clean development mechanism under the Kyoto protocol, which allows for offsetting 
credits in the EU ETS. Under single nutrient trading markets, abatement measures are 
implemented under either of the markets depending on marginal abatement cost and the 
equilibrium permit price. This will generate reductions in both nutrients when multifunctional 
measures have relative cost advantages in one of the nutrient trading markets. The choice of base 
line is then crucial; if it refers to nutrient loads without any policy in a specific point of time, or 
if it refers to the difference in nutrient loads compared to business as usual loads. The former 
baseline principle is adopted in the EU climate change policy which sets national plans for 
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carbon dioxide reduction compared with emissions in 1990. Such a baseline has been implicitly 
assumed in this paper, since it allows for nutrient credits in both markets irrespective of the 
origins of the nutrient load reduction. Under a business as usual baseline, additionality is much 
more difficult to establish since nutrient load reductions obtained in one market do not allow for 
credits in the other market. Such as baseline system would change the results obtained in this 
paper, and reduce the gains from double-dipping since the nutrient load credits obtained in the 
complementary market are decreased.  
 
 
Appendix A: Derivation of impacts of prices and initial allocations of permits  
                      on optimal abatement  
 
 
Applying the implicit function theorem on the first order conditions expressed by eq. (2), the 
Hessian matrix, H, and determinant are obtained as 
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where sub-indexes are second derivatives.  Solving for the impact of a nitrogen price change on 
abatement of phosphorus, i.e. fPP NR , gives 
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The Hessian matrix under monopoly, HM, is obtained from the first-order conditions (4)-(5) as 
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where )(
1111 NNNN MRLG −−=  and )(
1111 PPPP MRLG −−= . Simplifying (A3) by assuming 
linear price functions where the second derivatives do not exist, the impact of changes in 
1N
M  
and 
1P
M on *1NR  and *1PR  are found as 
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The denominator of (A4) contains two counteracting factors; the decrease in abatement in order 
to raise the own price (the first expression in the denominator of (A4)) and the associated loss in 
profits from a decrease in demand for phosphorus permits (the second expression).  Without 
cross effect between the nutrients, the decrease in *1NR and hence increase in pN would be larger 
since denominator would be higher and the numerator lower. In a similar vein  1 1P
M
NR   is obtained 
as 
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When only one market, say nitrogen trading, is subject to market power, the corresponding 
Hessian, HMN, is defined by 
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Solving for 1 1N
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Appendix B: Estimation of abatement cost function for the competitive fringe 
 
Descriptive statistics of costs of 500 random combinations of nitrogen and phosphorus loads are 
displayed in Table B1. 
 
Table B1: Descriptive statistics of data for variables in the fringe’s abatement cost  
                  function, n=500  
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min value Max value 
Costs, mill 
SEK1 
19827 16789 65 89090 
Nitrogen load, 
kton N 
394 105 201 563 
Phosphorus 
load, kton P 
9.6 3.7 3.2 16.0 
1) 1 Euro = 8.61 SEK Nov. 12, 2012 
 
Ordinary least square estimator is used to regress the estimated minimum cost as a quadratic 
function of nitrogen and phosphorus loads, see Table B2. 
 
Table B2: Regression results 
Independent variable, and 
test statistics 
Coefficient value t-statistics 
N  -631.7 -28.66 
P  -6169.6 -15.43 
N2 0.71 29.23 
P2 300.8 19.66 
NP -3.85 -6.42 
F (5, 494) 1840 
Adj R2 0.96 
 
The results show good statistical fit and does not reveal problems with heteroscedasticity 
       
 
 
Appendix C: Figure C1 and Table C1 
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Figure C1: Drainage basins of the Baltic Sea (originally from Elofsson. 2003). (Drainage basins 
in Denmark (2). Germany (2). Latvia (2). and Estonia (3) are not provided with names but are 
delineated only by fine lines) 
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Table C1: Abatement costs and permit prices in multi markets with monopoly power by  
                 Poland in either nitrogen or phosphorus markets.        
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
           
 
 
 
 
 
           1)   1 Euro = 8.61 SEK Nov. 25, 2012 
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